

# JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN MALAYA<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

The Japanese army landed in Kota Baru on the east coast of the Malay Peninsular early on 8 December 1941, several hours before the Pearl Harbour attack in Hawaii. The Japanese invaded Malaya, and Singapore fell on 15 February 1942. Since then British Malaya was under the Japanese Military control until 1945.

The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia aimed to obtain the natural resources and goods to continue the war against China and the Allied Powers. The violent exploitation, which ignored the local livelihood, brought chaos to the local economies. The three-and-a-half years occupation, although of short duration, had an enormous impact on the local economies and societies from the violent exploitation as well as political oppression and massacre.

This paper examines Japan's economic policy in occupied British Malaya (the Malay Peninsular and Singapore), especially about rubber estates with cases of a Japanese rubber estate company and the villagers in Johore and the forfeiture of Japanese assets after the war.

In this paper, Malaya is *Marai* for the Japanese military administration which consisted of the Malay peninsular and Singapore (*Shonan*) under the *Marai-Gunsei-Kanbu* (Central Military Administra-

tion in Malaya) administration. The dollar in this paper is the Straits dollars.

## Japanese Occupation and Economic Policy in the Southeast Asia

### *Invasion in the South and the Economic Policy*

The Japanese military government started studying economic plans when it was making preparations to invade Southeast Asia and presented the original proposal in November 1941 shortly prior to the invasion of Kota Bahru, Malaya, on 8 December 1941.

In early 1941, the Japanese General War Council set up a research squad to start making plans<sup>2</sup> to control the Southern territories such as the Netherlands Indies (currently, Indonesia) as they considered it indispensable to secure natural resources such as crude oil in order to wage war. The main purpose of invading the South was to obtain the natural resources and goods and it required procuring the war expenses locally to reduce the expenditures from the home country.<sup>3</sup>

“The Enforcement Plan of Military Administration of Southern Army (Proposal) (*Nanpou-gun Gunsei-shikou-Keikaku (An)*)” dated 3 November 1941 was prepared by the general headquarters of the Southern Army and included finance, currency, trade, development and acquisition of resources, transport, etc. as well as administration. It shows that they had already examined the concrete economic policies for the occupation at that point.<sup>4</sup>

At the council in the presence of the Emperor on 5 November 1941 which decided to negotiate with the United States and to attack the South, Suzuki Teiichi, Director of Planning Unit (*Kikaku-in Sousa*) reported the expected raw materials and goods to be obtained. In addition to crude oil in the Netherlands Indies and rice in Siam (Thailand) and French Indochina, he mentioned natural rubber, tin, bauxite and other materials in Malaya to fulfil the demand by the Southern operation and felt it could damage the United States (US).

“The Gist of Enforcement of Military Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories (*Nanpo-Senryochi-Gyosei-Jisshi-Yoryo*)”<sup>5</sup>

decided at the Liaison Conference at the Imperial Headquarters on 20 November 1941, also directed to restore law and order, to obtain important resources for national defence, and to secure the self-support of operation forces. It mentioned that it was to prevent important special materials such as crude oil, rubber, tin, tungsten, kina (cinchona), etc. from flowing out to the enemies. "The Outline to Rule Occupied Territories for the Southern Operation (*Nanpo-Sakusen-ni-tomonau Senryo-chi Tochi Yoko*)" (25 November 1941)<sup>6</sup> issued by the Army Division of Imperial Headquarters, also instructed it to aim principally to take measures to improve developing and obtaining important national defence materials to accomplish the war and to cultivate the Empire's capability to continue the war.

It was in "The Outline of Measures of Economy in the Southern Territories (*Nanpo-Keizai-Taisaku-Yoko*)"<sup>7</sup> issued on 12 December 1941 (after the outbreak of war) that we see the use of the term "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" for the first time in the economic policy for the Japanese occupation in the Southern territories.

It instructed the acquisition of important materials to carry out the war and the establishment of self-sufficient system of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere to reinforce and to fulfill the Empire's economy. In "The Gist of Enforcement of Military Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories" which was decided one month earlier, it said that Japan it should avoid calling for independent movements at once in the territories.<sup>8</sup> It showed that the official principal and slogan such as the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was only added later.

The Japanese military administration did not intend the liberation and independence of the Asian nations/peoples when they considered the necessity of invasion and occupation of the Southern territories. Even now, some right-wing groups in Japan still insist that the Japanese military administration had intentions to liberate Asian nations for independence because of the slogans of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. But it was wrong. In fact, the Japanese military administration in Malaya did not consider the possibility of granting independence right from the beginning. The Japanese government decided that Malaya was to be a permanent colony of Japan and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs reconfirmed the principle in February 1945 and the Ministry of Great East Asia did so in June 1945.<sup>9</sup>

### *Exploitation of Raw Materials from Malaya*

The principal target of the Japanese was to obtain strategic materials like crude oil in the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) and rice in Siam (Thailand) and French Indochina (Vietnam) as well as rubber, tin, bauxite, etc. in Malaya which could also hurt the US. And, British Malaya (Malay Peninsular and Singapore) was to have a central function for economy and transport in Southeast Asia.

Japan expected to exploit iron ore, bauxite and manganese as well as tin, natural rubber and tannin in Malaya.<sup>10</sup> According to the document "The Outline of the 25<sup>th</sup> Army Military Administration Enforcement (*Dai-25-gun Gunsei-Jisshi-Yoko*),"<sup>11</sup> the priority among resources in Malaya was firstly bauxite and manganese, secondly iron ore, tin and rubber, and thirdly tannin.

Japan, however, considered that the production of rubber and tin in Malaya had exceeded demands of domestic industries in Japan and planned to restrict production.

In the 1930's, the Malayan rubber accounted for between half to two-thirds of total world production and the Malayan tin made up one-third of world output. The Malayan rubber and tin were exported mainly to the US, a big manufacturer and whose share was 57% of the rubber export and 74% of the tin export.<sup>12</sup> So, Japan considered the rubber and tin as the major materials to be dominated among the Southern special resources and to be prevented from being smuggled to the enemy states. According to "The Outline of Army Management of the Southern Economy (*Nanpou-Keizai Riku-gun Shori-Yoko*),"<sup>13</sup> the production of rubber and tin was to be reduced as it exceeded the demand of the Empire.

But, in August 1942, six months after the Japanese occupation started, "Instructions of the Superintendent-General of Military Administration (*Gunsei-Sokan Shiji*)"<sup>14</sup> directed that the rubber and tin as world-wide special materials in the East should be considered not only to fulfill the demand in the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,

but also to control the world in the post-war period and to gain supremacy in the world economic competition as well.

### *Trade of Malaya*

The major characteristic of the pre-war Malayan trade was that the major importer of rubber and tin was the US. Unlike India which had close trade relations with the UK<sup>15</sup>, the US dominated 53% of Malayan export and the UK's share was only 15% in 1940<sup>16</sup>.

On the other hand, the major exporter was the Netherlands Indies whose share was 35% of the import and the second largest was Siam (15%) while the UK's share was only 14% and the US 5%. About half of the import from the Netherlands Indies was rubber and tin, but they were re-exported from Malaya.

About 70% of Malayan import was raw materials. The biggest item was rice and it came mainly from Siam and Burma (Figure 1). The domestic rice production supplied only 21-43% (average 35%) of consumption in Malaya and one-third of consumption depended on import<sup>17</sup>.

Thus, the Malayan economy, which depended on trading, was badly damaged when it was restrained from trading<sup>18</sup> and it was limited to sending goods to Japan besides trading with other Southern regions and the Axis powers.

During the pre-war period, Malaya exported rubber, tin and iron to Japan while Japan exported manufacturing goods to Malaya. The UK dominated only the manufacturing goods among items of the Malayan imports. In the 1930's, however, Japanese export increased in Malaya and the UK introduced the quota system for cotton thread and textile to limit the Japanese imports.<sup>19</sup> Although the UK saw Japan as a threat in the manufacturing goods market, the Japanese share in the Malayan trading was only 2% in the import and 5% in the export.

Figure 2 shows the trade between Malaya and Japan. In 1941 when the Japan-UK relations aggravated, the trading between Malaya and Japan shrank to less than half and in 1942 just after the war broke out, it dropped remarkably. However, even if it recovered to the level of 1940 under the Japanese occupation, it was only 5% of total trade

of pre-war Malaya. So it was obvious that Japan could not take over the whole volume of Malayan trade.

Malaya deeply depended on import, especially of rice, as mentioned. Malaya depended on the import of rice from Siam (Thailand) and Burma before the war and the domestic production only supplied one-third of local demand. After the autumn of 1942, rice supplies fell well below the level of pre-war imports because of the deteriorating war situation, irregular railway and marine transport services, and damage to Thai rice as a result of flood.

The supply of food and basic necessities<sup>20</sup> to the local people was a big subject as there were not many manufacturers in the area. However, Japanese faced serious shortages of food and goods even in the home country, so Japan could not provide them to the occupied areas. As Figure 1 showed, Malayan rice import shrank to 375 thousands tons in 1942 which is about the half of 1940. It decreased to 229 thousands tons in 1943 and to 94 thousands tons in 1944. In 1945 the amount was only 12 thousands tons between January to July. Japanese Military Government controlled prices of rice and reduced the ration with *kumiai* (association) system. For instance, the Selangor government reduced the ration from a generous 36 katis per month (about 48 pounds) for males over twelve years old to 17 katis by late January 1943. Japan directed the self-sufficiency of food in the colony in early 1944.<sup>21</sup> The Japanese military administration encouraged the increase of food production, tried urging people to grow their own food crops by utilising empty space, and later, experimenting with double-crop rice farming, and relocating people from towns and cities to rural areas, where they could grow their own food.<sup>22</sup> The local society could not get enough food and the death rate increased substantially because of severe food shortages and malnutrition.<sup>23</sup> No food relief was in sight until the end of war.

The Japanese occupation clearly had top priority over the Japanese military demands in Japan and colonies to continue the war. The military administration felt that the local people should endure the oppression for the military demands from the beginning of occupation.<sup>24</sup> Also, the principle for trading was to obtain materials and to get out of ideas of "barter trade" to reduce the economic burden.<sup>25</sup>

The bottleneck for sending materials to Japan was shipping. Under the occupation administration, all the transport and shipping were controlled by the army. According to the document of the 25th Army, the allocation of ships was only 60% or 80 thousands tons while the request of transport was 134 thousands tons in September 1942. The actual achievement was only 40% or 53 thousands tons.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, from late 1943 to early 1944, many vessels were damaged and sunk by attacks and it became more difficult to assign ships for the South.<sup>27</sup>

The transport and freight was not organised well since the actual contents of freight did not always reflect the instructions. This caused insecure shipping and transport and the lack of information about supplies. With vessel shortages and overstocking, however, the central council of Japanese army still expected more gain of materials and the local military administration authority planned the transport with the exceeded volume (Table 1).

The stock was not transported because of vessel shortages and the excess stock increased. The central council of Japanese army decided to buy the stock and the overstock piled up in harbours, estates, factories, etc.

The actual achievement of transport from Malaya to Japan was only 15% or 415,000 tons out of the target 2,814,000 tons in 1942. As a whole, the total volume of freight for four years of 1942-45 was 2,902,000 tons and it was only 33% of 8,543,000 tons, the development target for a year of 1944 (Table 1).

## **Rubber Estates under the Japanese Occupation**

### ***Control of Rubber Estates***

The rubber industry was the most important industry apart from the tin industry in Malaya and rubber was one of the strategic materials for the Japanese military administration. The rubber planted areas before the war was 3,278,000 acres and major states were Johore (27%), Perak (17%), Selangor (15%), Negri Sembilan (12%), etc. (Table 2). The rubber industry rapidly developed since "the rubber boom" of 1909-11<sup>28</sup> in Malaya. Japanese planters also opened smallholdings and estates in the 1910's and 1920's. The total planted area of rubber was

800,000 acres. Johore was the major state because of the 999-year lease.

The 25th Army Administration set "the Enforcement Plan of Important Industries" (undated) just after they started the military administration. They decided to organise "an association (kumiai) with private companies as a body to enforce and to be entrusted to manage" every important industry in Malaya "under the military administration supervision (control)." <sup>29</sup>

With this plan, they decided to organise an association to entrust the rubber estates management under unified control in Malaya. Yet, the military administration first worked on hostile rubber estates themselves to restore and manage them before necessary personnel arrived in Malaya. They also decided to buy products of rubber estates of third nations with the special account of provisional military budget to maintain operations and to send to Japan, and to encourage workers to work in un-operational estates.

Following this, the 25th Army decided in May 1942 and to set up "the Shonan Rubber Association (*Shonan Gomu Kumiai*)" with its headquarter in Singapore (*Shonan*). This Association was "to control and manage the production, collection, delivery, export and related work of rubber in Japanese estates and hostile estates under the military control in Malaya and Sumatra" ("The Tentative Gist of Shonan Rubber Association").<sup>30</sup> The Association was composed of representatives of 16 companies, which managed rubber estates since the pre-war times.

The Association decided prices and production allocation for each area. The price for raw rubber was 20 cents per pound for the first class sheet, 20-25 cents per pound for the first class pale crepe, and 26 cents per pound for the dry latex. "The minimum production" was 100,000 tons for Malaya (excluding Penang and Shonan Island) and 70,000 tons for Sumatra. The buyer companies of raw rubber were Mitsui Bussan, Nomura Tend (Higashi-Indo) Shokusan, Senda & Co., Koei Shokai, Kasho, and Mitsubishi Shoji.

In September 1942, 1,239 estates were managed under the Shonan Rubber Association. The total planted area was 1,981,000



acres and the workers numbered 237,000. The monthly production was 6,800 tons and the stock in estates was 30,000 tons.<sup>31</sup>

A Rubber Public Corps (*Gomu Koei-dan*) was considered for the hostile rubber estates. The idea was to assess the hostile rubber estates to issue shares for the Japanese nationals in exchange for war loan (wartime bonds) and to guarantee the dividend equal to the interest of national bonds. This was shelved after it was considered too early and impractical.

The Central Military Administration of the 25th Army drew up "the Outline of 25th Army's Agriculture-Related Companies Management" as a basic policy for management and control of hostile estates in October 1942. The Outline instructed the consignment management to appoint government-designated companies for the areas to self-manage and the Shonan Rubber Association shifted to be a control body.

The Planning Section of the Central Military Administration drew up "the Outline of Measure for Rubber (Proposal)" in 19 December 1942<sup>32</sup> and examined the production level for three years until end-1945 in line with world rubber demand. This Outline estimated that the world demand for rubber would be 1,200,000 tons with the regular stock of 300,000 tons for the post-war period. Since Britain and the US could supply 500,000 tons out of total 1,500,000 tons, Japan and Japanese territories would supply 1,000,000 tons. So it instructed to keep the 1,000,000 tons level of production and set the allocation and regulation of the production in Malaya, Sumatra, etc. It directed to maintain about 70% of the pre-war production level and to regulate the production for the year of 1943 to increase the quality and to reduce the cost. Particularly, it reduced the production by smallholders to 8% of pre-war production so that the land and labour forces could be used to increase food production.<sup>33</sup>

The Malay Military Administration discussed ways to improve the local self-support and to increase the food production as the major subjects since the first half of 1943. It was this "Outline of Measure for Rubber (Proposal)" formulated in December 1942, which started reviewing estates with reclamation of land for food production.

On 15 February 1943, "the Principle of Hostile Rubber Estate Allotment (*Tekisan Gomu-nouen Haitou Houshin*)" (by Planning Section, the Central Military Administration)<sup>34</sup> decided that "good hostile estates" were assigned to companies one by one for limited production" and that un-operated estates were maintained by chiefs of states. And the 40% of 1,628,000 acres of hostile estates were divided to entrust the Japanese planting companies to produce and the remaining 60% were kept by chiefs of states under the direct management by the Central Military Administration.

The appendix of this Principle stated that the "Rubber Control Association (*Gomu Tosei-kai*)" was to replace the Shonan Rubber Association as well as Estate Supervision Bureau to supervise the technical advice and the inspection.

The Administration allotted Japanese companies the areas for the rubber production and their buyers (Table 3) (See the case of Showa Gomu K.K. in the next section). It included the Japanese companies who operated since pre-war. Yet, Johore which consisted 27 % of rubber planted areas and had many Japanese planters, was allotted to a big trading firm such as Mitsubishi Shoji K.K.

The rubber prices were to be controlled under the Shonan Rubber Management Association (*Shonan Gomu Kanri Kumiai*). However, the price that was set as 20 cents per pound in May 1942 increased to 40 cents in April 1945 and would be double or triple in October. This price rise happened because every Japanese troop purchased independently. Also, there must have been illegal trading at black market as it was reported that Chinese black marketers illegally dealt with 3,000 tons of rubber at the black market in Singapore according to a survey by Okamoto, the Malay Rubber Management Association in November 1943.<sup>35</sup>

Unlike other agricultural and forestry products, there was no instruction for the rubber industry with long term perspectives from the Central Administration of Japanese Army in Japan until June 1943. So the 25th Army directed to regulate the surplus rubber production and to switch/cut land to prepare to increase food production in "the Outline of Measure for Rubber (Proposal)" in December 1942. In June 1943, however, the Central Administration of Japanese Army

sent a telegram to indicate the gist of long term policy about rubber estates that included to secure the pre-war production level, to ban reducing areas and felling rubber trees, to give priority to local smallholders products in purchase, etc.<sup>36</sup> The Malay Central Military Administration increased the purchase from smallholders from 18,000 tons to 100,000 tons by "the Matter on Revision of Purchase Target of Rubber" on 13 August 1943.

The Malay Central Military Administration indicated the revised target of purchase in mid-November 1943. The over stock of rubber was purchased with the provisional army budget and kept in the area-designated warehouses by "the Gist of Measures of Purchase and Storage of Overproduction Rubber."<sup>37</sup>

Thus, even in 1944 when the food production was more severe and more crucial, the rubber felling was not so much and it was about 7,400 acres.<sup>38</sup> And, some record indicated that the rubber productive capacity in Malaya was 86,000 tons<sup>39</sup> with 890,000 acres managed by Japanese companies and the local storage of raw rubber was 57,000 tons<sup>40</sup> at the end of war.

### **Cases of a Japanese Rubber Estate Company and Estates**

#### **a) Showa Gomu K.K. and the Rubber Estate<sup>41</sup>**

Japanese planters opened many estates in Johore in the 1910s and 1920s. A Japanese company, Nan-a Kabusiki Kaisha (K.K or Company), opened the T. S. Estate surveyed in 1911 in Kota Tinggi, Johore. The estate had 13,000 acres. Showa Gomu K.K. merged the Nan-a K.K., Sumatra Kogyo K.K., Tokyo Gomu Kogyo K.K., and Meiji Gomu Kogyo K.K. in June 1937. So T.S. Estate was Johore estate of Showa Gomu K.K. when the war broke out.

Japan invaded Northern French Indochina in September 1940 and concluded the Alliance with Germany and Italy. Japan invaded Southern French Indochina in July 1941 and was clearly opposed to the US and the UK. The British colonial government froze the Japanese property in Malaya on 26 July 1940.

There was 18 Japanese staff in the T.S. Estate and they were ordered to leave the designated defence area within two weeks by the

National Defence Ordinance on 16 August 1941. The company employed three British men including Gillchrist as the manager to manage the estate with the introduction by the consignor, R. Renton Co. Ltd. But, on 8 December 1941 when the Asia-Pacific War broke out, the estate was requisitioned by the Britain, and the employees were arrested by the army and were detained in a suburb of New Delhi, India and other locations.

When the Shonan Rubber Association was established in Singapore under the Japanese military administration in February 1942, Matsumoto Saburo, Executive Director of Showa Rubber K.K. became a director of the Association. He was installed as the chairman in May 1942.

As the Japanese army invaded Java and Sumatra, about 700 Japanese, about one-fourth of 3,000 Japanese prisoners in India were exchanged for British prisoners. Yet, the rest were compelled to stay in the interment camp until the end of war. The Japanese staff of Showa estates who were interned in India and Australia was exchanged with British prisoners and came to Singapore in September 1942. The estate was already under the control of the Shonan Rubber Association entrusted by the Japanese army then, and they joined the Japanese staff who came from Japan to work.

The Military Administration organised the Malay Rubber Management Association (*Malay Gomu Kanri Kumiai*) to replace the Shonan Rubber Association as a control body in October 1943 and asked Matsumoto to be the chairman.

The Showa Gomu K.K. was allotted 253,000 acres in Perak. The company's estates in Perak were run managed by Yoshihara, who served as Manager and other 17 staff who stayed at the headquarters located in Ipoh.

The southern estate area was relatively good with security and management in general. In some parts in Malaya and Sumatra, however, the production function was destroyed and the workers dispersed. Moreover, the transport was stopped and shortages of food and clothes were very critical. The productivity dropped because of shortages of capital and labour forces and the estates estimated the production to be about 20-30% of pre-war time.

In 1944, Japan lost command of the seas and damage of vessels increased. Vessels and warships of the army and the navy, and even wooden sailing boats were mobilised to ship rubber. But, they were attacked and sunk by combat planes and submarines. The supply of food and other materials decreased. The rubber production was eventually reduced and estates and staff had to concentrate on food production.

From January 1945 when the US Army landed in Luzon Island, the Philippines, the Japanese were unable to keep managing rubber estates in the Southern territories and began to produce food. And they repatriated from Malaya when Japan surrendered.

(b) Villagers in or near the Estate: Interviews

This section examines villagers' experiences and their memories of the Japanese occupation in or near T.S. Estate, Kota Tinggi, Johore. The interviews were conducted by the author in 1995 and 1996. The interviewees were 22 villagers who experienced the Japanese occupation and they comprised 15 Malays, 5 Chinese and 2 Orang Asli.<sup>42</sup>

According to the villagers who worked in T.S. Estate before the war, they made their living as tappers. The daily wage was 55 cents for male tappers and 45 cents for female tappers. They could survive but could not save money. They usually tapped rubber from 6am to 11am daily.

They did not have much formal education and some cannot read or write. Most of their parents worked in the estate, so they naturally started working as tappers in the same estate like the parents. There were no other jobs at the time.

The workers and villagers in or near the estate knew about the outbreak of the war when Japan bombed Singapore in 1942. On that morning before the estate workers went to fields, they saw Japanese combat planes flying to Singapore and bombing it.

At that time, the Japanese army had already landed in the Malay peninsular and the Japanese staff in estates told the workers that the war would start soon. And the estates were closed when Japan bombed Singapore. Workers said that Japanese administration staff of the estates returned to Japan without saying anything to the workers. But,

according to the record of Showa Gomu K.K., the Japanese were ordered to leave in August 1941 and they were arrested when the war started on 8 December 1941.

The Japanese staff in T.S. Estate gave a letter written in Japanese to each worker that he/she was a worker of the estate asking the authority to allow him/her to stay in the worker's quarters. The workers showed the letters to the Japanese military authority when they came to the estate. In this estate there were not cruel actions against workers by the Japanese army.

Most of workers lost their jobs as tappers when the war started. Yet, there were some who worked in estates when Japanese re-opened under the Japanese occupation. The wage system was changed from a daily system to a contract system and the wage was 3 dollars 50 cents per day.

Interviews with neighbours of the estate indicated the severe situation of their hardships and food shortages under the Japanese occupation. All the interviewees suffered from food shortages during the war, planted tapioca and sweet potatoes and saw people dying of diseases and malnutrition because of a lack of food and medicines.

They also heard about brutal acts by Japanese army. The Japanese army killed Chinese villagers particularly in Chinese neighbourhood such as Lamping, Timon, and Sungai Sembilan. In the Chinese village in Lamping, 10-20 Japanese soldiers came to the village and massacred about 200 Chinese villagers and burned all the houses. In the Chinese village in Timon, 50-60 Japanese soldiers came to the village and killed villagers.

Their experiences during the Japanese occupation included witnessing the different treatment meted out to different ethnic groups. The Chinese were the subject of hostility being viewed as potential activists and spies of anti-Japanese movement and the victims of massacre. So even if they themselves had no direct experience of such brutal act by the Japanese army, they ran away into jungles when they heard that the Japanese army was coming.

Kota Tinggi, Johore, was the place with the biggest number of massacres of Chinese victims in the Malay peninsular. The interviews included those of survivors and witnesses of massacres. The testimo-

nies of these massacres had some similarities. Usually the Japanese soldiers suddenly came to the village and gathered villagers to be killed without any official procedures. The testimonies, however, do not indicate that the Japanese army in some cases were investigating the presence of communists, subversive elements and saboteurs. In any case, however, the Japanese army did not follow any kind of legal procedures (to investigate, to arrest, to judge on the case, etc.) and killed the unarmed and unresisting villagers. The massacres were brutal and the victims included women, children and babies.

On the other hand, Malays were the subjects of favour from the Japanese army. The Japanese army tried to take advantage of them. The young Malay men were commended to join the army through the village heads in some villages (i.e. Kampung Tanjung Buai). A Malay man sympathised with Japanese slogans and believed that Japan was wonderful and that Malaya would go with Japan. Yet, Malays were also terrified to see the brutal acts such as killing villagers without reasons, exposing the victims' bodies and heads to public.

Stories by orang asli were also impressive. They lived on the opposite shore of Johore River to Kampung T.S. They lived in boats before the war. They were ordered to relocate to the land by the Japanese army. They suffered from food shortages and planted tapioca. Their family members died of food shortages and malnutrition. Although the Japanese army and the war brought all these troubles, they offered food to help Japanese soldiers when they came to ask for food. And they said farewell to them when they came to say good-bye.

All the interviewees lived in the neighbourhood. Malay villagers in Kampung Tanjung Buai came to the Chinese shops in Kampung Lamping and saw the Japanese army's massacre. The only survivor who ran away was saved by a Malay fisherman in the river and taken to the Kampung Tanjung Buai. Yet, in general, the relations between the Chinese and Malay communities were not so close. Their impressions and feelings about the Japanese army were different.

Gender also made a difference apart from ethnicity. For example, Malay girls were supposed to stay at home. So, even if the generation was the same, information and experiences they could have were limited for women.

### (3) Reparations and Rubber Estates<sup>43</sup>

When Japan surrendered, Malaya came under the British Military Administration. The British government prepared a scheme to rehabilitate the main industries as well as public facilities in Malaya. The estate sector got assistance from the government and was responsible for its own rehabilitation. Just after the war ended, they formed a company to ensure "a fair distribution" of equipment and services which faced shortages. Smallholders were provided equipment by a unit of the Ministry of Supply.<sup>44</sup> The tin industry required capital for equipment and the Malayan Chamber of Mines which represented the English companies, set up a Rehabilitation Committee and insisted that some financial assistance was required to re-start production.<sup>45</sup>

In early 1945, before the surrender of Japan, the Malayan Planning Unit planned a proposal for the Malaya Reconstruction Finance (Table 4). A sum of 43 million pounds sterling was allotted for rubber industry, the tin industry and industrial rehabilitation. The allotment for these industries consisted 9.5% and 20.5% of total budget of this finance plan. Later, the government gave financial assistance, 50 million dollars to the rubber industry as bank loan with government guarantee up to mid-1949 and 78.5 million dollars to the tin industry as the reconstruction loan up to the end of 1949.

After the war, in order to prepare to claim damages from Japan, the British authority in Malaya and Singapore set up the War Damage Claims Commission and required people to report War Damage Claims from early 1947 to November 1950 for damages.

The colonial government discussed the compensation for the war damage. It was mainly on the equipment, plant, machinery, etc. of rubber industry and tin industry.<sup>46</sup> The damage compensation for other nationalities beside British (i.e. American, Chinese, Australian, Canadian, etc.) was also discussed.<sup>47</sup> And the issue of common people in Malaya was not an issue for compensation while they were the objects to be supplied food, health service, etc.

The British government planned the Malayan War Damage Compensation Scheme with 475 million dollars (Table 5 (a)). However, the amount of the budget from the home country and compensation from Japan was in the plan was considered too little and it was criticised



that the burden of Malayan taxpayers was too much as 50.4% of the budget was to come from the local government. A revised scheme was announced in 1949 (Table 5(b)). In this scheme, the compensation from Japan, which was originally asked for a substantial rise, was reduced from 85.7 million dollars to 60 million dollars since the US government was opposed to claim the compensation to Japan. This new proposal was criticised as the Malayan burden was still heavy at 33.8%, but it was approved for fear of delay in payment for compensations.<sup>48</sup>

However, the US insisted that Japan should not be allowed to claim damages for its economic recovery in the structure of the Cold War and the home country, Britain officially renounced the right to claim for reparations with the Peace Conference in San Francisco in September 1951. The Peace Treaty prohibited claiming for reparation from Japan, but gave the right the Allied Powers to reserve the Japanese property in the jurisdictions. So all the ex-Japanese property which was forfeited by the British authority in Malaya was to be sold by auction. At the end of 1952, the War Damage Fund did not have any source from the compensation made by Japan, but have instead, 60 million dollars which came from the selling of Japanese properties in Malaya (Table 5(c)). The assets held by CEP was the non-hostile property that was sacked by Japanese and the original owners were unidentified. The source of these assets was accounted to be 73.3 million dollars at the end of 1952 but the amount of sales was 70.5 million dollars up to the end of 1958.

Thus, the source of the War Damage Compensation included the money by selling Japanese assets left in Malaya at the end of 1952. The *Straits Times*, 14 May 1948, however, noted an objection that the CEP holding assets 50 million dollars included the Japanese assets as the Japanese rubber estates of 80,000 acres were not a trophy of war, but the permanent property of peacetime economy in Malaya. And a Chinese newspaper on 9 September and 11 September 1951 insisted that it is unreasonable to make up with the Japanese assets for compensation and that 60 million dollars by the Japanese assets was too little for the damages and loss by war. It also insisted that it ignored people in Malaya.<sup>49</sup>

Japanese assets were mainly rubber estates and iron ore mines. The Japanese owned rubber estates were 11-company-owned 88,068 acres and individual-planter-owned 10,137 acres in 1941. The lease period was 99 years or 999 years and many Japanese estates were concentrated in Johore that offered 999-year lease.<sup>50</sup> According to "the Table of Record of Japanese business in the Southern Army Territories at the End of the War," Japanese managed mines totalled 29 and while factories numbered 98 when Japan surrendered. Factories included 10 steel manufacturers, 14 chemical, 17 automobile and related (including repair), 4 paper and print, 9 ceramic, 22 general machine, 3 fabric, 2 medicine and hygiene, and 17 lodging.<sup>51</sup>

The ex-Japanese owned rubber estates were under the management assigned by Malayan and Singaporean governments, and the smallholdings were rented out to local residents until the Peace Treaty decided the measures to deal with ex-Japanese assets. The T.S. Estate in Johore was also requisitioned by the state government of Johore after the war, and was re-opened by the British.

And the Japanese estates were sold by auction from June 1951 to 1955. The auction system was to sell in a big lot by the minimum price. So Malayan planters could not join the bids because the lots were too big for them. Also, the price per acre was the minimum, so it benefited British planting companies.<sup>52</sup> T.S. Estate was bought by a Chinese businessman, Heah Joo Seang. He bought rubber estates totalling 26,000 acres for about 6 million dollars and would keep the estate until he sold to B. Company in 1977.

At the end of 1958, the CEP finished the activity and the War Damage Committee, which was, set up in 1950 also completed its task. At the moment, 46.2 million dollars out of 49 million dollars raised by selling ex-Japanese assets in Malaya was included in the War Damage Compensation Fund. And 21 million dollars out of 23 million dollars raised by selling Japanese assets in Singapore was incorporated into the Malaya War Damage Compensation Fund up to the end of 1954. The non-hostile assets were sold until the end of 1958 and the 70.5 million dollars was incorporated in the source for the Fund.

The fund by selling Japanese assets was 67.2 million dollars and it accounted for 15% of the Fund. There was no document about the

final allotment for compensation, but the payment and allotment until 1952 was in Table 6.

Malayan people insisted that the compensation fund should be used for the social welfare and to aid war victims and bereaved families. The fund, however, was used for reconstruction of industries, especially British rubber and tin companies. It benefited the British and the fund was allotted for British big companies.<sup>53</sup>

### Conclusion

Japan invaded Malaya to obtain strategic materials. But Japan considered the production of rubber and tin in Malaya exceeded Japanese demand and, initially, planned to restrain production to prevent outflow to the enemy countries. Malaya had a geographically important position with strategic military purposes, yet Japan did not have the capability to provide enough food and basic necessities such as clothes, paper, medicines, etc. for the local community. Japan merely exploited materials to send to Japan. The Japanese army requisitioned estates, mines and factories and assigned the management to the private companies under the military administration. However, rubber estates and tin mines could not maintain the production level and the produce could not be shipped consistently and the stocks accumulated in the ports and estates/mines because of lack of vessels.

After the war, the Japanese-owned rubber estates were requisitioned. Its properties were sold by auction and the money was incorporated in the war damage compensation fund. With the advent of the Cold War, the US declined to continue demanding reparation from Japan.

After the invasion, rubber estates were controlled by the association (*kumiai*) and the factories were taken over by Japanese companies under the Japanese military administration. And, Japan could not utilise the rubber and tin in Malaya due to the damage at the start and the lack of transportation (shipping) at the later stage as well as lack of industries to consume the volume in the home country. Moreover, the Japanese military administration could not supply enough food and

other basic necessities local economy and Malaya suffered from severe food shortages during the war.

After Japan surrendered, the British colonial government confiscated the Japanese estates and other property that Japanese owned during the pre-war time. The Japanese assets were sold by auction and the money was incorporated into the source of the War Damage Compensation Fund.

The UK renounced the right for repatriation from Japan since the US declined claiming the repatriation from Japan by the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in San Francisco in 1951 and requested other countries to follow because of the Cold War. Hara Fujio (1994) pointed out that it is necessary to include the War Damage Compensation scheme by the UK government and the Friendship Treaty with Japan when discussing the Japanese repatriation.

The War Damage Compensation scheme whose source included the pre-war Japanese-owned private property was used mainly for the big companies. The big estate and tin companies who were mostly British and recovered following the economy rehabilitation programs by the UK government and profited from the Korean War as well. On the other hand, the Malayan community suffered from the war as they could not get the compensation from Japanese and UK government although they contributed to a lot to the home country with rubber for many decades and with donation to the war as its colony. While the UK government settled the issue in the structure of the Cold War, however, for Malayan/Malaysian nationals, it still required to continue discussing issues on the Japanese compensation for war damages including the forced "50-million-dollars contribution" obtained from the Chinese community in Malaya during the War.

## Note

- <sup>1</sup> I appreciate the generous supports and help by Prof. Akashi Yoji, Prof. Hara Fujio, Prof. Nakahara Michiko and Prof. Yamada Hideo. They guided me to research on this topic and gave me advice and suggestions as well as the materials. I also express gratitude to Dr. Paul H. Kratoska who kindly provided his publication
- <sup>2</sup> The squad submitted the proposal, "*Nanpo-Sakusen-ni okeru Senryo-chi Tochi-Yoko-An*," but it was not used. The section of policies for industries and trade said "the main focus is on obtaining the natural resource and therefore self-support and living of occupied territories residents should be minimum if possible. "*Nanpo-Gunsei-ni Tomonau Senryo-chi Tochi-Yoko*" (*Tairiku-Shi* No. 993 Appendix No.1, 25 November 1941) is similar with the proposal's content and ideas and Teruhiko Iwatake, *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, Volume 1 & Volume 2, Tokyo: Ryukei-shosha Publishers, 1995. This note, Vol. I, pp, 24-25, surmised that the proposal was used for it.
- <sup>3</sup> "*Nanpo-Sakusen-ni okeru Senryo-chi Tochi-Yoko-An*."
- <sup>4</sup> Iwatake, *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, Volume 1, pp. 34-35.
- <sup>5</sup> *Dai-hon'en Seifu-Renraku Kaigi Kettei-tuzuri*, No.2, Ministry of Defence, Section of War History, p. 118.
- <sup>6</sup> "*Shi*" Volume 5, "*Tairiku Shi*" No. 993, Supplement No.1118, Ministry of Defence, Section of War History.
- <sup>7</sup> Dai-Toa-Sho ed. *Nanpo Keizai-Taisaku*, p. 20.
- <sup>8</sup> *Nanpo Senryo-chi Gyosei-Jisshi Yoryo*, decided at the *Dai-Honei Seifu-Renraku Kaigi* on 20 November 1941.
- <sup>9</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "*Maraya-no Dokuritsu-Mondai*," 20 February 1945 and Document of *Dai-Toa-sho Kankei*, June 1945, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- <sup>10</sup> *Nonpo-Sakusen-ni Tomonau Senryo-chi Tochi Yoko*, 25 November 1941 (Section of War History, *Shi*, Volume 5, *Tairiku Shi* No. 933 Supplement No.1).
- <sup>11</sup> Document without date, *Dai-25-Gun Shirei-bu, Gunsei-Shiryo* Document, No.19.
- <sup>12</sup> Great Britain, Board of Trade, *Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth for each year of ten years 1936 to 1945*, 1947, pp. 168-169.
- <sup>13</sup> "Section 8 *Tai-Teki-sei-Koku Keizai Appaku*" in *Riku-A-Mitsu* No. 3393 Supplement, *Gunsei-Shiryo* Document No. 46.
- <sup>14</sup> *Gunsei-Shiryo* Document No. 20.

- <sup>15</sup> Mako Yoshimura, "Shokuminti-to-shite-no Malaua-Keizai-to Igrisu: Malaya-no Gomu-to GB-US Boueki (Malayan Economy under the British Colonial System: Malayan Rubber and the G.B.-U.S. Trade Structure)", *The Journal of Economic Studies* (The University of Tokyo), No. 34 (December 1991): 10-20. 1991 discusses the trade structure.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12; Cheng Siok Hwa, *The Rice Trade of Malaya*. Singapore: University Education Press, 1973, Appendix IX, p.42. The import of rice increased with the increase of population by labour immigration for the rubber and tin industries. Although the British colonial government encouraged the increase of rice production, it was not successful since Malay smallholders preferred planting rubber as cash crop. Moreover, it was relatively easy to import rice from the neighbours, Siam and Burma which were under the British influence.
- <sup>18</sup> *Dai-25-gun Gunsei-Josshi Yoko*, in *Gunsei-Shiryō* Document No.19, undated.
- <sup>19</sup> Yoshimura, "Shokuminti-to-shite-no Malaua-Keizai-to-Igrisu, pp.12-13.
- <sup>20</sup> Necessaries of life were controlled by "Seikatsu-Hitsuju-Busshi-no Rinji-Sochi-ni kansuru-ken", in *Marai-Kan-rei* No.10; *Marai-Koho*, No. 22, 20 August 1943, which required sales licence, "Seikatsu-Hitsuju-Busshi-no Hanbai-Seigen-ni kansuru-ken" in *Marai-Kan-rei*, No.12; *Marai-Koho*, No. 30, 10 September 1943, which prohibited sales except assigned sellers. Simultaneously, "*Bukka-Tosei-rei*" in *Nan-Sokan-rei*, No.16; *Marai-koho*, No. 31, regulated the prices.
- <sup>21</sup> The Central Council of Military Administration ordered to establish the system of production by 1945 in January 1944 and the Malayan Military Council instructed it in March 1944.
- <sup>22</sup> The military government enforced the semi-annual production of crop and conversion of land-use, transmigration of urban residents to rural areas, compulsory delivery of paddy to the government in Malaya See Iwatake, *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, Volume 1, pp. 241-249; Chin Kee Onn, *Malaya Upside Down*. Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications, 1946, pp. 46-47 and pp. 57-58; Paul H. Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya 1941-1945*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1998, Chapter 9.
- <sup>23</sup> The annual number of deaths increased from 16 thousands in 1940/41 to 30 thousands in 1942 and 43 thousands in 1944 in Singapore. It increased from 92 thousands in 1940 to 123 thousands in 1943 and 146 thousands in 1944, see Kratoska 1988, pp. 276-277.
- <sup>24</sup> "*Nonpo-Senryo-chi Gyosei-Jishi Yoryo*", 20 November 1941.

- 25 “*Nonpo-Keizai Rikugun Shori Yoryo*”, 30 December 1941 (*Riku-A-Mitsu*, No. 3392 Supplement, *Gunsei-Shiryō* Document, No. 46).
- 26 *Gunsei-junho* by the 25th Army Central Military Council, early-October, 1942.
- 27 Iwatake 1995a, pp. 117-8.
- 28 G.B. Colonial Office 1911, p. 38.
- 29 “*Juyo-Sangyo-no Jishi Keikaku*”, *Gunsei-Shiko-jo-no Kitei, Seirei, Fukoku, Hoshin, Keikaku-Yoryo Tuzuri* (*Gunsei-Shiryō* Document, No. 46, non-dated).
- 30 “*Shonan Gomu Kumiai Zantei Yoryo*,” 17 May 1942.
- 31 “*Senji-Geppo*,” *Marai-Gunsei-Kanbu*, September 1942.
- 32 *Gomu-Kankei Shorui*, *Gunsei-Shiryō* Document, No. 22.
- 33 This should be normally planned by the headquarter in Japan but this was planned by the local military authority for long-term and total perspectives for the rubber industry. Iwatake regarded that the staff had the high planning capability but that the idea to supply surplus labour forces by the reclamation was rather an armchair (impracticable) one Iwatake, *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, p. 229, Chin Kee Onn, *Malaya Upside Down*. Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications, 1976.
- 34 *Gomu-Kankei Shorui*, *Gunsei-Shiryō* Document, No. 22.
- 35 “*Malaya: Japanese Penetration of the Rubber Manufacturing Industry*,” NARA RG226 XL23029.
- 36 *Riku-A-Mitsu* No.3607, 15 June 1943. Iwatake pointed out that they sent the telegram without the official examination and permission by the Sixth Committee or other authorities in Tokyo. He supposed it was because they tried to stop felling rubber trees for increased food production projects in Malaya and because they tried to smooth things by indicating some policies on rubber to local military authorities before the Prime Minister and the Minister of Army, Tojo came to inspect the Southern territories as he was said to be concerned in rubber, see Iwatake, *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, p. 231.
- 37 “*Senji-Geppo*,” *Marai-gunsei-Kanbu*, November 1943, *Gunsei-Shiryō* Document, No. 7
- 38 *Marai-wo Kataru-kai* 1978, p.116.
- 39 *Marai-wo Kataru-kai* 1978, pp.117-118.
- 40 Imaoka’s memo; Iwatake *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, Volume 1, p.126.
- 41 The section is mainly by the information from Showa Gomu Company History Editorial Board eds.1969, pp. 25-26 and pp.118-125.

- <sup>42</sup> The hearings were done by the author mainly in Malay (Bahasa Melayu). The record of hearing/interviews is Mako Yoshimura, "Nihon-Gunsei-ki-no Malaya-no Estate-no Sonmin (Malayan Villagers in an Estate under the Japanese Occupation: Interviews in Johore) (1)-(4)," *Society and Labour*, 43(1 & 2)(November); 43(3&4)(March); 44(1)(September); 44(3&4)(March), 1996-98.
- <sup>43</sup> This section's discussion is mainly by Fujio Hara, "Nihon-to Malaysia-Keizai." In Fujio Hara, ed., *Malaysia-ni oketu Kigyo-group-no Keisei-to Saihen*. Tokyo: Institute of Development Economies, 1994.
- <sup>44</sup> FO371/46340.
- <sup>45</sup> FO371/46340.
- <sup>46</sup> CO825.
- <sup>47</sup> CO825/44/11; CO825/45/5.
- <sup>48</sup> Fujio Hara, "Nihon-to Malaysia-Keizai", in Fujio Hara, ed., *Malaysia-ni oketu Kigyo-group-no Keisei-to Saihen*, Tokyo: Institute of Development Economies, 1994, pp.159-167.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.167-168 and p.171.
- <sup>50</sup> Fujio Hara, *Eiryo-Malaya-no Nihonjin*. Tokyo: Institute of Development Economies, Table 7, p. 224 and Table 4, p. 222.
- <sup>51</sup> Iwatake, *Nanpo-Gunsei-ka-no Keizai-Shisaku*, Volume 2, Appendix Table 4-3, 628.
- <sup>52</sup> Hara "Nihon-to Malaysia-Keizai", p. 176.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.




Table 1 Japanese Target and Achievement of Major Materials in Malaya (tons)

Materials	End of 1941		1942		1943		1944			1945	1942-45
	(1) Actual Production	(2) Target of Acquisition (End of 41)	(3) Actual Import of Japan	(4) Actual Import of Japan	(5) Target of Development (End of 41)	(6) Plan of Sending Materials to Japan	(7) Actual Import of Japan	(8) Actual Import of Japan/Target of Sending	(9) Actual Import of Japan	(10) Total of Actual Import of Japan	
Raw Rubber	650,000 (600,000a)	100,000	(158,517b)	20,461	C) 300,000	110,000	18,750	17%	17,541	56,752	
Tin	80,000	10,000	-	7,934	C) 20,000	18,000	6,132	34%	3,077	17,143	
Iron Ore	2,000,000	500,000	76,887	37,700	2,500,000	-	-	0%	-	114,587	
Bauxite	150,000	100,000	2,032	251,645	200,000	1,200,000	268,057	22%	21,414	543,148	
Manganese	25,000	30,000	-	-	40,000	14,000	400	3%	-	400	
Tungsten	-	-	-	-	-	300	169	56%	112	281	
Palm Oil (& Coconut Oil)	-	-	-	32,038	-	20,000	-	0%	-	32,038	
Cobra Oil	160,000a	50,000	-	-	M) 160,000	35,000	7,798	22%	497	8,295	
Tannin Material	NA	5,000	-	559	10,000	-	323	-	-	882	
Tannin Extract	-	-	-	130	-	-	242	-	-	372	
Resin	-	-	-	1,752	-	1,000	54	5%	-	1,806	
Derris Root	100a	100	23	262	1,000	800	142	18%	-	427	


Note: M: Maintain the present level  
 C: Control and reduce the production level  
 a: Actual Export  
 (1) *Senji-Geppou (Wartime Monthly Report), May 1942.*  
 (1) *Nanpo Keizai Taisaku-Yoko (Outline of Measures for Southern Economy). Attached Sheet 1 (12 December 1941).*  
 (1) *Ministry of Finance, Japan. Annual Report of Japan Foreign Trade, various issues.*  
 (2) *Naichi-Kanso-Keikaku Kiso-an (Basis Proposal for Plan of Sending to the Mainland), 1944. Nanpo-Gunsei-sokanbu Somu-bucho-Kaigi Haifu-shiryō*  
 (3) *Besshi Dai-2.*

Figure 1 Import of Rice in Malaya 1938-45




Source 1937-38: Great Britain, Board of Trade, 1939: 158.  
 1939-40: Great Britain, Broard of Treade, 1947:164.  
 1942-45: Marai-wo Kataru-kai. 1967: 113

Figure 2 trade between Malaya and Japan, 1937-45




Source Compiled from Ministry of Finance. *Annual Report of Japanese Foreign Trade*, various issues: Iwatake 1995b: Appen dix 2-18: 498 and *Nanyo-Nenkan* (Yearbook of South Seas), 1218-1220 (Iwatake 1995b: Appendix 2-7, 475).

Figure 3 Production of Tin in Malaya, 1937-45



Source; Department of Mines, Federation of Malaya 1949: Appendix IV, 62

Figure 4 Production and Export of Rubber, 1937-45



Note The export of 1937-41 exceeded import because it includes re-export, which came from other countries

Source; Compiled from Data of Table 1 and Dept. of Agriculture, Federation of Malaya 1947: Table 11, 12 and 13

Table 2 Rubber Area in Malaya, 1938

State	Area (acres)	%
Johore	890,000	27.2
Kedah	302,000	9.2
Trengganu	43,000	1.3
Kelantan	92,000	2.8
Perlis	5,500	0.2
Perak	563,000	17.2
Selangor	496,000	15.1
Negri Sembilan	381,000	11.6
Pahang	173,000	5.3
Singapore	53,000	1.6
Malacca	194,000	5.9
Penang	18,000	0.6
Province Wellesley	68,000	2.1
Total	3,278,000	100.0

Source: Malaya, Department of Agriculture 1938: 3.

Table 3 Japanese Planters and the Allotted Areas and the Exporters under the Japanese Occupation

Planters	Allotted Area	Exporter
Shonan Saibai Kumiai (Association of Japanese small holders)	Singapore including Riau Island	Mitsui Bussan K.K.
Sango Kongsi	Most parts of Johore	Mitsubishi Shoji K.K.
Nanai Gomu K.K.	Muar and a part of Tangkat district in Johore	Kasho K.K.
Nanyo Gomu Takushoku K.K.	Most parts of Kluang districts in Johore	Kasho K.K.
Nettai Sangyo K.K.	Malacca, South Negri Sembilan	Mitsui Bussan K.K.
Malay Gomu K.K.	Northern parts of Negri Sembilan	-
Toyo Takushoku K.K.	Pahang	-
Nanyo Gomu K.K.	Southern Parts of Selangor	Nikka Kongsi
Nissan Norin K.K.	Northern parts of Selangor	Koyei Shokai
Showa Gomu K.K.	Perak	Nomura Tohindo Shokusan K.K. (south parts), Senda & Co.(north parts)
Senda Gomu	Penang and Province Wellesley	Senda & Co.

Malaya: Japanese Penetration of the Rubber Manufacturing Industry, NARA RG226 XL23029.

Table 4 Proposal of Finance for Reconstruction in Malaya, March 1945

	(million pounds)
Reconstruction and repair of public facilities (Trains, electricity, water supply, communication, roads, etc.)	3,715
Public expenditure exceeded over the local revenue)	
First two years/ including wages	2,400
Treatment for initial Emergency	2,282.5
Rehabilitation of Industries	
(1) Tin mines	2,600
(2) Rubber estates	1,200
(3) Other industries	500
Total	12,697.5

Source: A Letter from S.Caine to Lord Keynes, 29 March 1945( T220/52)

Table 5 Malayan War Damage Fund (\$ million)

	(1)Sept. 1948	(2)July 1949	(3)Dec. 1952
(1) Free gift from British government	8,570	17,140	17,140
(2) Japanese reparations	8,570	6,000	-
(3) Japanese property in Malaya	-	-	6,000
(4) War Risks Insurance Fund	1,200	-1,160	1,940
(5) Assets held by Malayan CEP	5,200	8,100	7,330
(6) Malayan government contribution	23,960	-	-
(7) Interest-free loan from British government	-	15,360	14,970
Total	47,500	45,440	43,500

Source: Hara Fujio 1994, Table 2, 4 and 5, 160-163.

Table 6 Claims submitted to Commission for War Damage Compensation, 1952

Claims in respect of:	Amount (\$ million)
Tin	19,075
Rubber	37,925
Industrial/commercial	19,100
Dwelling houses	5,875
Private chattels	16,350
Stock-in-trade	12,675
Livestock/crops	2,450
Other	17,375
Total	130,325

Source: Memorandum on Proposals for a Malayan War Damage Compensation Scheme, p.7 (Quoted from Kratoska 1998: Table 11.9, 337).

Table 7 Allocation and Payment from the War Damage Compensation Fund (\$ million)

	Allocation(Sept 1948)0	Payment(Dec. 1952)
(1) Rubber planting	8,500	4,110
(2) Tin mining	8,500	5,660
(3) Private chattels	5,000	1,960
(4) Requisition	-	3,650
(5) Other claims	15,500	-
(6) Other claims	-	3,880
(7) War Risks (Goods) Insurance Scheme	10,000	1,940

Source: Hara Fujio 1994, Table 2, 4 and 5, 160-163.